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1 |
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2008 Lecture 6: The Revisability Puzzle Revisited. |
This is the sixth lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 Jul 2008 |
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2 |
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2008 Lecture 5: Epistemology without Metaphysics |
This is the fifth lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 Jul 2008 |
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3 |
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2008 Lecture 4: Is that Really Revising Logic? |
This is the fourth lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 Jul 2008 |
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4 |
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2008 Lecture 3: A Case for the Rational Revisability of Logic. |
This is the third lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 Jul 2008 |
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5 |
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2008 Lecture 2: What is the Normative Role of Logic? |
This is the second lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 Jul 2008 |
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6 |
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2008 Lecture 1: A Puzzle about Rational Revisability |
This is the first lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 Jul 2008 |
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7 |
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2007 Lecture 6: Knowing what we are thinking |
The sixth lecture will try to resolve a familiar tension between externalism about mental content and the assumption that we have some kind of privileged knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 Jul 2008 |
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8 |
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2007 Lecture 5: Acquaintance and essence |
Russell held that we must be acquainted with the constituents of the contents of our thoughts, and remnants of this doctrine persist in the work of a number of more recent philosophers. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 Jul 2008 |
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9 |
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2007 Lecture 4: Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability |
The fourth lecture will begin with a variation on the thought experiment about Mary that is the focus of the knowledge argument, using it to develop the analogy between self-locating knowledge and knowledge of phenomenal experience. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 Jul 2008 |
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10 |
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2007 Lecture 3: Locating ourselves in the world |
One strategy for responding to the knowledge argument exploits an analogy between knowledge of phenomenal experience and essentially indexical or self-locating knowledge. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 Jul 2008 |
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11 |
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2007 Lecture 2: Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument |
The second lecture will begin with Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. The argument and the responses to it turn on assumptions about the nature of the contents of belief and the objects of knowledge. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 Jul 2008 |
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12 |
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2007 Lecture 1: Starting in the middle |
Our topic is a subject's knowledge of his own phenomenal experience and of the content of his thought, but I will approach the topic from the outside, treating the subject as an object in the world. |
Robert Stalnaker |
26 Jun 2008 |
